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Category Archives: Harm reduction

Outreach to sex workers and their clients, not abolitionism, saves lives

I can’t really believe this isn’t so obvious as to go without saying, but yet another peer-reviewed study published in the Lancet this week shows that outreach to sex workers and their clients – including condom distribution, one-on-one safe sex counselling and efforts to reduce stigma – can make a dramatic contribution to HIV prevention. The study was conducted in a number of Indian states over a five-year period.

Sex work in India has a similar status to Ireland: it’s not illegal in and of itself, although many of the surrounding activities (solicitation, brothel-keeping etc) are. A campaign to criminalise clients was opposed by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare and by the National AIDS Control Organisation, which operates under the Ministry’s aegis, for the precise reason that this would impede the fight against HIV/AIDS. In taking this position, the Indian authorities echo the views of bodies from the World Health Organisation to UNAIDS to the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health, as Stephanie and I noted in this post.

The logic behind this view isn’t difficult. When commercial sex is criminalised – whether for the buyer, seller or both – it hides. The persons involved shy away from social and medical services, due to fear of arrest, of blackmail, of loss of custody of their children, of being treated like deviants. The stigmatisation created by these laws is a powerful force, often overriding even the assurance that sex workers themselves won’t be prosecuted for their activities. This is reflected in a report published earlier this year by the Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare (only in Swedish, unfortunately), which describes on pages 62-63 an interview with a small-town sex worker who admits she does not go for regular HIV testing because of this fear of being identified as a “prostitute” and therefore stigmatised. This can happen even where commercial sex is entirely legal, of course, but there is little dispute among those who work with or study sex workers that the stigma is much greater where it is criminalised.

But that’s not the only problem. Abolitionism is, by its nature, incompatible with harm reduction, and efforts to combat HIV/AIDS often conflict with moral opposition to the behaviours that put people into high-risk categories. This is the case whether we’re talking about sex workers and their clients, injecting drug users or men who have sex with men. But while most western countries, at least, have begun to come to grips with reality in relation to the last two categories, there is still often a stubborn refusal to accept the need to do the same for the first. In Ireland, the main NGO doing outreach to sex workers, Ruhama, offers sex workers cups of tea but not condoms; in Sweden, the Federation for LGBT Rights noted in a report last year (also only in Swedish), on pages 2 and 8, that HIV prevention programmes directed at sex workers and their clients have been blocked because of the state’s zero-tolerance approach to commercial sex. Whatever your personal views of the sex trade, this is fucking crazy.

The evidence that these programmes save lives is so clear that one conclusion is inevitable: to some people, lives are less of a priority than making a “statement” about the morality of the sex trade. They wouldn’t be unique in that view, of course. It’s the same attitude that leads conservative groups to oppose young people having access to condoms, or teenage girls getting the HPV vaccine. But it may go even further than that. Describing the reluctance to adopt measures that could reduce sex workers’ risk of violence, Hilary Kinnell in Violence and Sex Work in Britain theorises at 29-30 that sex work opponents see this violence as a “necessary deterrent”, a warning to people not to enter the sex trade because they might end up dead. If they stop ending up dead, there’s less of a disincentive to doing sex work. And so there’s less of an incentive for sex work opponents to try to prevent sex workers ending up dead.

Some would be outraged by this accusation, but Kinnell didn’t make it up out of nowhere. She cites from a 1977 Observer article in which Polly Toynbee alleges that this was precisely the justification given to her by a Home Office official as to why prostitution should remain “dangerous”. Kinnell writes that “no one would admit that policy is driven by such thinking today” – but this was before Sweden published its 2010 “evaluation” of its sex trade law, which stated that the increased stigma and other negative effects “must be viewed as positive from the perspective that the purpose of the law is indeed to combat prostitution”.  This was before Stockholm Police Superintendent Jonas Trolle told the BBC that “It should be difficult to be a prostitute in our society – so even though we don’t put prostitutes in jail, we make life difficult for them.” These comments don’t state in so many words that they want sex workers to face risks to their health and their lives – but since the increased stigma is itself a risk to their life, as indeed are some of the other ways by which life is “made difficult” for them, that really is what it amounts to.

If abolitionists are genuinely motivated by regard for the well-being of sex workers, they need to explain how this can be reconciled with opposition to programmes that demonstrably improve their health and safety. It’s not enough to simply argue that they are trying to take them out of the high-risk category. People within this category have as much right to health promotion as people in any other. That’s not just my personal view; that’s international law.

And if – like their religious colleagues – they do believe that the threat of serious illness or death is an appropriate tool of social control, then at the very least they should be honest about it and stop dressing up their arguments in the language of concern.

Canadian court approves drug injection facility. Is sex work next?

The Canadian Supreme Court issued a landmark decision today in Canada v PHS Community Services, a case concerning the Vancouver supervised drug injection facility Insite.

Insite had been operating for several years, and there was both anecdotal and scientific evidence to demonstrate its effectiveness in keeping injecting drug users alive, improving their access to safe injection information and encouraging them into treatment – without leading to increased numbers of new or relapsed users. It operated under a discretionary exemption to federal drug laws, an exemption which the Conservative government eventually decided not to renew.

The Court had a few questions to answer, but the key one from my perspective was whether this decision breached Insite users’ rights under Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which states:

Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.

The Court unanimously ruled that it did. It stated:

 The Minister made a decision not to extend the exemption from the application of the federal drug laws to Insite. The effect of that decision…would have been to prevent injection drug users from accessing the health services offered by Insite, threatening the health and indeed the lives of the potential clients.  The Minister’s decision thus engages the claimants’ s. 7 interests and constitutes a limit on their s. 7 rights…this limit is not in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.  It is arbitrary, undermining the very purposes of the CDSA, which include public health and safety.  It is also grossly disproportionate: the potential denial of health services and the correlative increase in the risk of death and disease to injection drug users outweigh any benefit that might be derived from maintaining an absolute prohibition on possession of illegal drugs on Insite’s premises.

In response to Canada’s argument that it was a “policy question” whether or not to grant such exemptions – you can read this argument as saying “we know we haven’t got a leg to stand on as far as evidence is concerned, but we should be able to impose our moral and ideological view anyway” – the Court stated:

The issue of illegal drug use and addiction is a complex one which attracts a variety of social, political, scientific and moral reactions. There is room for disagreement between reasonable people concerning how addiction should be treated.  It is for the relevant governments, not the Court, to make criminal and health policy. However, when a policy is translated into law or state action, those laws and actions are subject to scrutiny under the Charter…The issue before the Court at this point is not whether harm reduction or abstinence-based programmes are the best approach to resolving illegal drug use.  It is simply whether Canada has limited the rights of the claimants in a manner that does not comply with Charter.

So strongly did the Court feel about the matter that it did not, as I had feared it might, take the easy way out and issue a mere declaratory order (essentially, one that acknowledges a right was violated without requiring any concrete action on the government’s part). Instead, it mandated the Minister for Health to grant the exemption. Although exemptions are discretionary, it stated, that discretion must be exercised in a manner compatible with the Charter – and

 On the trial judge’s findings of fact, the only constitutional response to the application for a s. 56 exemption was to grant it.

Clearly, this is a massive victory for the users of the Insite facility, for harm reduction principles, and for simple common sense. It’s also a welcome step along Canada’s slow path of developing a constitutional right to health (like Iarnród Éireann, they’re not there yet, but they’re getting there). And finally, it points in a favourable direction for the outcome of another landmark case, Bedford v Canada, a challenge to laws that criminalise various aspects of sex work.

To summarise Bedford briefly, it concerns provisions of the Canadian Criminal Code that outlaw keeping a “bawdy-house” (which basically means any place regularly used for commercial sex, even if by only one sex worker), living off the proceeds of another person’s sex work, or communicating in public for the purposes of engaging in paid sex. These provisions were struck down by an Ontario Court on the basis of absolutely mounds of evidence showing that they materially contributed to sex workers’ risk of violence – without having any demonstrable effect on the amount of paid sex actually taking place. Judge Susan Himel found that

there are ways of conducting prostitution that may reduce the risk of violence towards prostitutes, and that the impugned provisions make many of these “safety-enhancing” methods or techniques illegal.

The parallels to the Insite case should be obvious. Both concern behaviours that the government wishes to condemn on moral grounds, and the use of criminal laws as a tool of its condemnation. Though in both cases a deterrent effect was also alleged, this was not supported by the evidence before the court. To the contrary, the only effects demonstrated were threats to the lives and safety of vulnerable people affected by the laws – in violation of their Charter rights to life, liberty and security of the person.

Of course, the two cases aren’t entirely analogous. Insite concerns the direct provision of a type of medical care, while Bedford is really about avoidance of harms caused by third parties (there is a significant body of evidence linking criminalisation of sex work with diminished access to health care, but the plaintiffs didn’t make that argument). And it was significant in Insite that addiction is viewed as a disease: the Court saw this as undermining Canada’s claim that it is not drug laws, but rather drug users’ behaviours, that give rise to the dangers they would face if the injecting facility was shut down. In the ongoing Bedford case, Canada is continuing to blame sex workers for their own risks, and “disease” is obviously not something the plaintiffs can (or would want to) come back with.

Nonetheless, it’s hard not to see the Insite judgment as a decisive victory for evidence over ideology, a rejection of the imposition of laws that have a demonstrably harmful effect on a particular population and no apparent beneficial effect apart from making some people feel good about the morally-derived “message” conveyed. And that has to bode well for the future of Bedford (currently awaiting an appellate decision, which itself is likely to be appealed to the federal Supreme Court). It’s still always possible that the courts will find the Criminal Code provisions against sex work so materially different to the withdrawal of Insite’s exemption that a different ruling must apply. But if I was Terri Jean Bedford, or any Canadian sex worker, I think I’d be wearing a hopeful smile today.